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1. Introduction 
Traditional environmental policies set out to reduce air pollution by direct regulation, 
mainly in the form of emission standards. An example is the EC large fuel combustion plants 
directive which prescribes for new combustion plants emission standards in terms of mg SO2 
per m3 flue gas, depending on the size of the plant. This type of rule leaves the responsible 
manager little room with regard to how and by how much to reduce SO2 emissions. More 
flexibility can be created by assigning emission quota. The larger the number of sources, 
plants or firms that is involved, the larger is the flexibility and the scope for cost savings in 
pollution control. One step further is to create markets for emission permits, with regular 
trade and price notations that signal the scarcity of the environment in its function as a sink 
for emissions. 
In this paper we shall give a survey of efforts that have been made to relax the 
rigidity of the traditional system of direct regulation in Europe and the USA. The experience 
runs from simply adding quotas to the existing system of emission standards in Europe to the 
creation of full-fledged markets in the USA. The question then arises whether European 
countries can and should follow the US example or avoid such radical policies.' 
Therefore the objectives of this paper are twofold: 
1. to analyze how a selected number of schemes to increase flexibility in air pollution 
control are designed and operate in practice; 
2. to evaluate their cost-effectiveness, environmental effectiveness (the extent to which 
environmental goals are met) and administrative practicability (information require- 
ments and costs). 
The paper is limited to applications for air pollution. 
1 Overviews of the use of economic incentives, and marketable permits in particular, 
have been provided by Anderson et al. (1990), Carlin (1992), Elman et al. (1992), 
Hahn, (1989), Hahn and Hester (1989a, 1989b), Opschoor and Vos (1989), and 
Tietenberg (1990), among others. These overviews are biased since they mainly rely 
on the experience in the USA. They ignore recent steps in Europe as well as 
international applications. Moreover, they do not deal with the most recent and 
radical attempt to implement marketable permits: sulphur emission trading in the USA 
after the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. This paper attempts to bridge the gap. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses European steps to 
increase flexibility, evaluating Danish (section 2. I), Dutch (2.2) and German experience (2.3) 
and giving an assessment in section 2.4. Section 3 concentrates on EPA's emission trading 
program in the USA, describing its rules and the experience in running the program in 3.1 
and comparing it with European actions in 3.2. Next, in section 4, we describe the sulfur 
allowance trading scheme in the US acid rain program. Section 5 gives the conclusions, 
Increasing flexibility in Europe 
In Europe, authorities have made efforts to increase flexibility under the existing 
system of emission standards. This section surveys the solutions and experiences in three 
countries : Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany. 
2.1 Power plant quota in Denmark 
The quota arrangements 
As in other European countries, reduction of SO2 emissions in Denmark is realized 
mainly by setting emission standards for new sources. However, as early as 1984, Denmark 
accepted legislation that imposed a bubble of 125000 kton S$ on the emissions from its 
power plants, to be attained in 1995. In 1987 a ceiling for NO, was set. On the basis of 
ongoing international negotiations the original ceilings have been lowered. As of June 1993, 
the SO2 quota is 116000 kton for 1995 and 73000 kton for 2000. The NO, quota for 1995 
is 85000 kton and 61000 kton for the year 2000 (Elkraft, 1993). The objective of these 
quotas is to provide more flexibility to the power plants in meeting emission reductions 
(Ssrensen, 1993). 
The Ministry of Environment fixes the quotas each year for the coming eight years 
after a review of plans submitted by the power companies. Two power plants consortia are 
involved: Elsam and Elkraft. Quotas for the first four years are binding and quotas for the 
remaining four years are provisional. The quotas pertain to aggregated emissions of all plants 
with a capacity of 25 MWe or more. Although quotas are fixed on an annual basis, the 
annual ceilings may be exceeded maximally by 10% as long as the cumulative emission 
ceilings for the four-year period (1993-1996 and 1997-2000) are not exceeded (Elkraft, 
1993). 
The quotas are set on the basis of zero net import of electricity. If (net) import of 
electricity occurs, the national emission quota is reduced by the calculated quantity of 
emissions that would have occurred if the electricity now imported would have been 
produced in Denmark. 
The allocation of the annual ceilings over both power plant companies is left to the 
two companies. They can rearrange emission reductions (Ssrensen, 1993). However, 
flexibility is limited, since emission standards for new plants as laid down in the EC-directive 
on large combustion plants and in Danish regulations for NO, have to be met (Ssrensen, 
1993). Finally, compliance is necessary with national ceilings that are set for amounts of 
emissions by existing large combustion plants under the same EC-directive. 
Regarding monitoring and enforcement, the electricity companies have to submit 
reports containing information on past emission each year, on future development of 
emissions, as well as on the pollution control measures foreseen. Local authorities are 
responsible for monitoring and enforcing the actual emission levels. 
Cost savings and environmental impacts 
Estimates of the cost savings of the bubble concept are not available. Cost savings are 
expected since the power companies can shift to low sulfur fuels and to other fuels (natural 
gas, biomass) in addition to applying flue gas desulfurization and other technical measures 
(Ssrensen, 1993). The power companies do seem to aim at meeting the emission quotas at 
minimum costs in order to keep electricity price as low as possible (Elkraft, 1993, p.B7; 
Olsgaard, 1994). 
At the same time, the structure of the Danish electricity industry is such that some 
doubts about efficiency remain. The shares of the formally private power companies are held 
(indirectly) by local communities, among them the city of Copenhagen, which might have 
other objectives than pure cost minimization. There is room to pursue such objectives, since 
the two consortia possess more or less monopoly positions in their region and the Danish 
energy law allows the inclusion all costs in the electricity price (Olsgaard, 1994). This 
suggests the existence of a so-called 'soft budget constraint'. This means that the strict 
relationship between expenditure and earnings of an economic unit is relaxed since extra 
expenditures can be covered by extra support (Kornai, 1986). 
Regarding environmental effectiveness, available data suggests that actual emissions 
for 1992 for both sulfur and nitrogen oxides were around 10 percent below the allowed 
quotas. In previous years emissions were also below the quotas and they are expected to 
remain lower than the quota in the future (Elsam/Elkraft, 1993). Power companies regard 
it as one of their goals to ensure that the quotas are met, if only because they want to avoid 
negative publicity. This, combined with uncertainties inherent in planning electricity 
production, implies that actual emissions might turn out to be lower than the quotas 
(Olsgaard, 1994). 
Little is known about the administrative practicality of the Danish quota system and 
its impact on innovation. The quota system might be less practical than emission standards 
due to the additional meetings between the environmental Ministry and the power companies 
(Serrensen, 1993). 
2.2 Sector covenants and bubbles in the Netherlands 
The covenant with the electricity producers 
In the Netherlands, the authorities responsible for reduction of SO2 emissions are the 
national government and the governments of the provinces. The traditional policy has been 
to set national emission standards, taking into account the EC-emission norms. As an 
innovation in policy, the national government of the Netherlands and the twelve provinces 
signed a covenant on the reduction of sulfur- and nitrogen oxides emissions with the union 
of electricity producers (SEP) and the four individual electricity producers in 1990. The 
covenant is an agreement between the parties in which the united electricity producers 
commit themselves to reduce acidifying pollution more than was asked by existing standards 
(SEP, 1991) up to the year 2000. The motive for the ceilings is that they offer the electricity 
producers possibilities to reduce emissions in a more cost-effective way than would be 
possible by requiring uniform emission standards for classes of installations (SEP, 1991). 
The objective of the covenant is to reduce SO2 emissions of power plants to 18 
kiloton and NO, emissions down to 30 kiloton in the year 2000. The ceilings are not 
completely fixed but leave some elasticity.2 Electricity producers are public utilities, very 
much as in Denmark, and are owned by the provincial authorities. Although there are four 
electricity producers, decisions on fuel use and the utilization of the means of production are 
taken by the SEP. Producers participate in a system of cost-sharing that compensates 
producers who have to use relatively expensive fuels and equipment. In this sense the bubble 
implies intra-firm rather than interfirm trading. 
Regarding monitoring and enforcement, the SEP has to produce a plan that spells out 
the measures to reduce emissions to the level set in the covenant every two years. The plan 
has to be approved by an expert commission in which the Ministry of the Environment, the 
SEP and the provinces are represented. The individual producers have to report to the 
provinces and the SEP. The provinces agree to implement the covenant but can defer from 
this if that is necessary to meet air quality standards other than standards for the reduction 
of acidification. Parties can alter the covenant if unexpected environmental changes occur. 
The ceilings can be altered if electricity demand or import depart substantially from what was 
planned. The parties can also have the covenant dissolved if they cannot agree on the 
emission reduction plans or if the ceilings cannot be met by all reasonable means (SEP, 
1991). 
Is the covenant cost effective? 
In implementing the bubble the SEP has to observe certain limitations: 
1 .  existing power plants have to meet the existing emission standards; 
2. relatively new plants have to meet more stringent standards, laid down in the 
covenant. 
Despite these limitations, electricity producers expect that the covenant saves them 500 
million guilders compared to an alternative policy of setting stricter uniform emission 
standards to meet the same ceilings. This would have raised costs to 1 billion guilders. The 
The SEP can increase the NO, cap by 5 million kg if the SEP supplies also heat on 
the basis of 1250 MWe. If the actual heat supply is less, the allowed increase is 
reduced proportionally. The sulphur cap can be increased by 4 million kg if flue gas 
desulphurization units are out of operation due to technical problems but operate 
within the applicable legal framework. These corrected ceilings can be exceeded once 
every three years by 3 million kg maximally. 
cost savings are achieved by applying more expensive pollution control equipment that 
reduces emissions below the required emission standards on those combustion installations 
that have a longer remaining lifetime, have more operating hours per year, or have to be 
upgraded anyway (Lubbers, 1993). 
Regarding the environmental effectiveness, the covenant states that in order to reduce 
acidification it is especially important to reduce the total volume of emissions in the 
Netherlands (SEP, 1991). This raises the question whether the covenant can indeed meet the 
total emission ceiling. On the one hand, the covenant offers several possibilities to bust the 
caps (such as heat supply, other electricity forecasts, non-operating flue gas scrubbers) and 
the SEP eventually can back out of the agreement that raises some doubts. On the other 
hand, the government can threaten with the (more expensive) alternative: setting more 
stringent uniform emission standards in new legislation as well as also lowering the caps in 
case of unexpected environmental changes. 
Bubble and averaging for refineries 
Existing policies for oil refineries do allow some flexibility: instead of a standard for 
each single source, an average standard was set of 1000 mg S02/m3 flue gas for the sum of 
fuel-related or process emissions for groups of plants per refinery. This implies that some 
combustion plants within a single refinery may overcomply and others may undercomply, as 
long as the average standard is met. This regulation has been complemented by an agreement 
between the Ministry of the Environment and the five companies engaged in oil refining. 
Parties agreed on a ceiling of 36 kiloton SO2 emissions for the oil refinery sector as a whole 
from the year 2000 onwards. The 36 kiloton bubble corresponds with a 1000 mg S02/m3 
standard at the 1980 level of oil input. Therefore, the 36 kiloton emission ceiling can be seen 
as an instrument to prevent growth of emissions arising from increasing oil input. The 
distribution of the maximally 36 kton of emissions is left to the five companies that together 
own six refineries. Each single refinery still has to meet the average emission standard of 
1000 mg so2/m3 flue gas. Moreover, this average emission standard will be lowered to 500 
mg in the near future (Dekkers, 1993). 
Cost savings and environmental impacts of refinery bubbles 
Estimates of the cost savings of the bubble and of setting an average standard are not 
available. The largest flexibility is probably not reached by the cap but by the average 
emission standard. The cost savings are refinery-specific; some refineries have 30 plants 
within a refinery, others only two (Dekkers, 1993). Gaasbeek (1993) doubts whether the 
average standards give so much flexibility, since refineries have fewer installations than the 
electricity producers. Some companies have installed (catalytic and thermal) crackers, such 
as Esso's flexicoker, primarily for economic reasons: cracking increases the share of light 
oil fractions which have higher market values. As a byproduct, sulfur emissions have 
decreased considerably: down to 350 mg S02/m3 in refineries that have installed such 
crackers. Actual (1993) SO2 emissions were around 60 kiloton despite a formidable increase 
in oil input. This implies that there is no additional constraint for refineries that meet the 
average 1000 mg/m3 standard. One would expect no trade between refineries under such 
conditions and, in practice, inter-refinery trading seems not to have occurred. Therefore, the 
potential obstacle to trade arising from the fact that no distribution of emission permits to 
individual refineries had taken place was not an actual bottleneck. 
If the emission standard would be lowered to 500 mg S02/m3 on average per refinery, 
given the same fuel input and quality as in 1993, maximal total emissions would be 22.5 
kton. This suggests that the new, average emission standard per refinery would be the 
binding constraint and not the cap of 36 kton on total emissions of all refineries taken 
together. Consequently, the cap would not give any incentive for interfirm trading of 
emission permits, since every single refinery has to meet the average standard. The new 
standard would reduce the demand for emission reductions from other firms to zero, not 
allowing any cost savings other than intra-firm 'trading'. 
The environmental effects of the bubble are not straightforward. Given the increased 
fuel input compared to that in 1980, the cap does, in principle, prevent the increase in 
emissions above their 1980 level, and, in effect, lower the effective average emission 
standard from 1000 to 800 mg/m3. However, the installation of crackers, driven by economic 
motives, reduced actual emissions below the ceiling of 36 kton SO2. 
Monitoring does not seem to have solved any problem, since total emissions can 
easily be calculated on the basis of fuel input, sulfur content and information about the 
applied abatement technology. Adding process emissions, and accounting for catalytic 
crackers gives total emissions (Dekkers, 1993). 
The administrative practicability of the average emission standard and bubble are 
believed to be high. One single standard for each refinery requires less administration than 
separate standards for every single installation, as is the case in Germany. The concept of 
an average standard also fitted better into the existing regulatory framework that in the past 
prescribed average sulfur content of 2% S (3400 so2/m3) in the fuel cocktail of each refinery 
(Dekkers, 1993). 
2.3 Offsets in Germany 
Plant renewal clause and compensation rule 
In Germany the transfer of emission reduction obligations from one unit or firm to 
another is possible as a means to control air pollution. Two rules apply: the plant renewal 
clause and the compensation rule. 
The plant renewal clause pertains to the construction of new plants in areas where air 
quality standards are exceeded. In principle, the Federal Irnmission Protection Law ("Bundes- 
immissionsschutzgesetz") and the Technical Guidelines for Air Pollution Control rule out 
construction of new plants in non-attainment areas - which are areas where the air quality 
standards are exceeded - even if the firm meets the state-of-the-art emission standards. The 
plant renewal clause in the 1974 technical guidelines, however, does allow the location of 
a new plant in such a non-attainment area if the new plant replaces an existing plant of the 
same kind. These plants do not have to belong to the same firm but have to be located in the 
same area. In 1983 the guideline was extended; not only the closing down of an existing 
plant but also its renovation could be used to offset the additional emissions of a new plant. 
The offsets, however, would have to lead to a reduction in the annual average concentration 
in the area and the new plant has to meet the state-of-the-art emission standards (Sprenger, 
1989; Opschoor and Vos, 1989). 
The compensation rule was included in the 1986 revision of the technical guidelines. 
As part of the revision, existing installations had to be modernized to meet the stricter 
emission standards, usually within five years. The core of the compensation rule is that the 
cleanup period can be extended to eight years if emission reduction measures taken at 
existing installations (from the firm or other firms) would provide more emission reductions 
than would otherwise result from application of the technical guidelines for each individual 
plant. This compensation can only be used by installations within the same geographical area 
of impact and for the same pollutants or pollutants with comparable impacts (Scharer, 1993). 
Cost-efficiency and environmental effectiveness 
The cost saving derived from the plant renewal clause is limited since it can be 
applied only in the few areas where air quality standards are exceeded. It is peculiar that the 
rules of the clause further restrict its cost-efficiency. The clause can only be used if the 
additional environmental stress from the plant is limited to 1 percent, if the additional 
emissions are fully offset by plants in the same area and if the new plant starts operating after 
the closing down of the old plant. Moreover, the clause does not apply to the location of new 
plants in attainment areas even if this would not lead to exceeding air quality standards 
(Sprenger, 1989). 
The contribution of the compensation rule to cost savings is also small. In only 50 out 
of 17000 clean-up cases was the rule used (Scharer, 1993). The most important reasons for 
its restricted use are (Scharer, 1993; Sprenger, 1989): 
- the short time limit for approval of plant renewal proposals (one year); 
- the stringent emission reduction requirements at existing installations; 
- the necessity of multiple trades since most new firms emit more than one pollutant 
in the air; 
- the small size of the areas in which offsets are allowed. 
The environmental impact of both the renewal clause and compensation rule is neutral 
to positive. The renewal clause prevents increases in emissions in non-attainment areas. The 
compensation rule can only be used if total emissions are reduced further (Sprenger, 1989). 
On the administrative requirements, no data was available. Sprenger (1989) believes 
that the plant renewal clause stimulates innovation but does not supply empirical evidence. 
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2.4 Evaluation of European experience 
The European experiences with giving polluters more flexibility in making their own 
choices have mainly taken the form of bubbles and compensation schemes that allow increase 
of emissions at a source as a compensation for decreases elsewhere. The schemes have the 
common property that the increased flexibility has been used almost exclusively for internal 
compensation. We have found no evidence for 'external' trade where permission to emit was 
transferred from one party to the other in exchange for money. This also implies that a 
market for emissions could not develop. 
The absence of markets and the preponderance of internal solutions is explained by 
several factors. It is partly explained by the structure of the industry, such as the electricity 
producers in the Netherlands, who are organized as a legal cartel, as well as the high degree 
of concentration in the Danish electricity industry. A second reason, valid for the oil refinery 
sector in the Netherlands, was the absence of real scarcity, which would have given rise to 
external trade in emission permits at a positive price, and the fact that emission quotas were 
not allocated to individual firms but to the sector as a whole. A third reason is that 
flexibility, which has been given with one hand, has been taken away with the other hand by 
maintaining existing direct regulation and even by adding additional requirements (such as 
the case of the 1983 revision of the plant renewal clause in Germany). It should be noted that 
these last features also limit the opportunities for internal compensation and for improving 
cost effectiveness. 
It is striking that the bubbles have been granted to homogeneous sectors. There is a 
plausible interpretation for this. Authorities were willing to reduce their own direct grips on 
emissions at the firm level only in those cases where they could negotiate with the group and 
make it responsible for keeping emissions below the ceiling. If the group can be held 
responsible for (good) performance, it is not really necessary to delineate an exact level of 
initial emissions to which the single polluter is entitled. The absence of a clear statement of 
baseline emissions for individual firms is indeed one of the features of the European bubbles. 
Certainty on group performance would be difficult to achieve if the group was 
heterogeneous and the number of polluters involved was large. At the same time, if parties 
are heterogeneous and large in numbers, the opportunities for external trades and the 
development of a formal market for emissions would increase. But then clear contracts and 
enforcement by the authorities require an initial distribution of emission allowances among 
polluters. 
This contrast between the demands of a market for emission permits, on the one hand, 
(heterogeneous polluters, large numbers, delineation of entitlements) and actual policies on 
the other hand (homogeneous polluters, small numbers, no delineation of entitlements), 
supports the conclusion that the European arrangements for increasing flexibility discussed 
in this paragraph were never intended as a basis for the development o f  a market for 
emission permits. Much more, the bubbles had the nature of a direct regulation for the group 
as a complement to the direct regulations for each single polluter within the group. 
3 .  EPA's emission trading policy 
3.1 Design 
The basic statute governing air quality in the USA is the Clean Air Act. The Act is directed 
at the implementation of emission control strategies to meet national ambient air quality 
standards (NAAQS). These standards specify maximum allowable concentrations for specific 
pollutants in the air (Liroff, 1986; USEPA, 1990). Ambient standards exist for CO, NO,, 
lead, particulates, ozone and SO2 and are set by EPA (the Environmental Protection 
Agency). For non-attainment areas, where one or more of the standards are violated, 
individual states have to develop state implementation plans (SIP) showing which measures 
will be taken to meet the standards. For attainment areas, where air quality is better than the 
ambient standard, prevention of significant deterioration standards (PSD) specify the 
allowable increments in concentrations. Moreover, technology-based emission standards (new 
source performance standards (NSPS)) were introduced in 1971 for both new and modified 
sources. These are, in order of stringency: lowest achievable emission reduction (LAER), 
best available control technology, accounting for economic considerations (BACT), 
reasonable available control technology, accounting for technological and economic feasibility 
(RACT). For non-attainment areas, new and modified sources have to comply with the most 
stringent standards: LAER. In these areas, existing sources have to apply RACT. In 
attainment areas, new and modified sources have to apply BACT (Liroff, 1986). 
The development of emission trading began in 1972. In response to the formulation 
of NSPS, smelter operators proposed to avoid these standards if the additional emissions of 
new or modified sources could be netted out by other, cheaper measures at the same plant. 
(This was officially allowed in 1975 but a court decision in 1978 struck down this rule.) 
Nowadays, netting is allowed only insofar as the new or modified sources meet the applicable 
emission standards and if applicable emission standards are met by the plant. 
Meanwhile it became clear that states could not meet their SIP deadlines and the offset 
policy was born. This policy allowed new and modified sources to enter non-attainment areas 
as long as they applied LAER technologies and any additional emissions would be offset by 
other existing sources in the same area; not necessarily within the same plant or firm. In 
practice, an 'overcompensation' of 10 to 20 percent has often been demanded. (This looks 
very much like the German plant renewal clause of 1974 discussed in section 2.) In 
attainment areas offsets are only allowed if the PSD standards are met. 
In 1979, banking of emission reductions was allowed and the bubble concept was 
introduced. Banking allows firms to store permitted emissions that have not been used for 
later use. The bubble allowed emission trading between existing sources in attainment areas 
(Liroff, 1986). Within the bubble some sources are allowed to emit more than the BACT 
emission standard, on the condition that other sources compensate by reducing emissions 
more than the BACT standard demands. Both internal and external bubbles exist. In 1982, 
the bubble concept was revised, and interim, generic trading rules were formulated and the 
bubble was extended to non-attainment areas (USEPA, 1982). In 1986, EPA published its 
final emission trading policy statement, setting out general principles for emission trading 
(USEPA, 1986; Borowsky and Ellis, 1987). 
The objectives of the emission trading policy are to stimulate more economically 
efficient means of control and to promote flexibility in order to meet air quality standards 
more quickly (USEPA, 1979, 1982, 1986). The pollutants covered are all air pollutants for 
which national ambient air quality standards exist, as well as hazardous pollutants. 
A tradeable permit, or emission reduction credit (ERC), is defined as an emission 
reduction that is surplus, enforceable, quantifiable and permanent. Surplus means a reduction 
not currently required by law. This might pertain to an emission reduction below: 
* the baseline emissions required for attaining and maintaining NAAQS; 
* the applicable emission standards for new and modified sources. 
A number of emission reductions are not eligible for use in emission trading such as 
reductions resulting from plant shutdowns. All existing sources and major new stationary 
sources in both attainment and non-attainment areas can trade (Borowsky and Ellis, 1987). 
The initial distribution of permits is based on grandfathering. It depends on the 
definition of baseline emissions which are typically determined on a case-by-case basis. For 
attainment areas, the baseline emissions generally are the lower of the actual or allowed 
emissions of the firm. For non-attainment areas with approved SIP plans, baseline emissions 
are the emissions used in the SIP. For similar areas without approved SIP, baseline emissions 
should be the lowest of either actual or SIP allowable or FUCT allowable for each of the 
three baseline factors for each source involved in the trade. 
The options to increase flexibility (netting, offsets, bubbles and banking) cannot 
always be used to avoid emission standards and are not always mandatory (Hahn and Hester, 
1989b, p. 370). In both non-attainment and attainment areas, new sources cannot use offsets 
to avoid emission standards (LAERIBACT). In these areas, modified sources, however, can 
use netting, and existing sources can use bubbles to avoid these standards. Only offsets are 
mandatory for both new and modified sources in non-attainment areas. Netting and bubbles, 
as well as offsets in attainment areas, are only optional and not mandatory. 
The final generic rules governing trading as formulated in 1986 are manifold: 
* Trades must be for the same pollutant; 
* For particulates, SO2, CO and lead trades must satisfy ambient tests. For VOC and 
NO, no such test is required. An ambient test is a demonstration made to show that 
the trade has no significant impact on air quality. Trading is not allowed to violate 
NAAQS or PSD increments in attainment areas and cannot create new violations or 
delay in meeting NAAQS in non-attainment areas. Generally, this requires air quality 
modelling, unless the emission increases are below certain minimum levels or sources 
are located within 250 meters distance and certain conditions are met; 
* Interstate trading is allowed as long as the requirements of the more stringent state 
are met; 
* Emission credits from existing sources cannot be used to avoid NSPS for new 
sources, that is BACT in PSD areas or LAER in non-attainment areas; 
* Bubbles are allowed in non-attainment areas as long as: baseline emissions reflect the 
lowest of actual SIP allowable or FUCT allowable emissions, there is a net air quality 
benefit (at least 20 per cent cutback in emission below baseline levels), ambient tests 
are satisfied.) 
Finally, states may adopt alternative, generic trading rules that assure attainment and 
maintenance of NAAQS. Such state rules are not permitted to allow increase of emissions 
above the baseline. States have interpreted these rules to guarantee the NAAQS in three 
ways: requesting offset rates exceeding unity to ensure that emissions are reduced, limiting 
trading to relatively small zones to avoid hot spots, or requiring dispersion modelling (Hahn, 
1986). 
3.2 Cost-effectiveness 
There is no dispute that EPA's emission trading policy resulted in considerable cost savings 
although it is also evident that the number of transactions that took place was lower than 
expected. Table 1 gives an overview of the 'traded7 volumes and the estimated cost savings 
of the four systems (Hahn and Hester, 1989a; Dudek and Palmisano, 1988). Table 1 shows 
that the total expected cost savings range from 1 to 13 billion $. Annual cost savings are 
somewhere between 100 to 1400 million $. This is, maximally, 4 per cent of total air 
pollution control expenditures since 1975 (Anderson et al., 1990). 
Netting can be regarded as the most successful part of the scheme. The large range 
in estimated trades reflects the lack of data. Cost savings of netting consist of savings in 
pollution control costs and savings in costs of permitting procedures. The average control 
costs savings are estimated at 0.1 to 1 million $ per case. Firms also save permit costs since 
netting avoids the use of permitting procedures for major sources. These permit costs savings 
range between 5000 and 25000 $ per case (Hahn and Hester, 1989a). Of the 2000 to 2500 
offsets that took place 90 per cent were intra-firm. Palmisano and Dudek (1988) estimated 
a cost saving of $10000 per offset. By mid 1986, around 130 bubbles had been approved and 
around 100 were pending. Only 2 of these were interfirm. The estimated cost savings of the 
130 bubbles range from 435 to 570 million $. The lower value uses lower average cost 
savings for state approved trades (less bureaucracy) and the higher value uses EPA estimates 
of an average cost saving of $3 million per bubble (Hahn and Hester, 1989a). The cost 
savings of banking are not available but are believed to be small in view of the small number 
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Table 1. Trades and cost savings under EPA's policy 
Type Volume Cost savings Period Annual cost savings 
(nr of trades) (million US$) (million US$) 
Netting 5000- 12000 525-12300 1974-1984 53-1230 
Offsets 2000-2500 20-25 1977-1986 2.5-6 
- internal (800-2250) 
- external (200-250) 
Bubbles 132 435-570 1979-1986 60-80 
- EPA (42) (300) 
- States (90) (1 35-270) 
Banking < 120 small 1979-1986 
Sum 980-13135 116-1435 
of trades. Remarkably, most of the costs savings have been realized by intra-firm netting or 
bubbles. 
Various explanations have been offered for the relative paucity of EPA's emission 
trading. The major circumstances can be grouped in: 
* regulatory restrictions on trade; 
* uncertainty on status of property rights; 
* high transaction costs. 
Regulatory restrictions on trades were manifold. The demand for permits was limited 
since trading was crafted onto an existing regulatory framework (Boland, 1989). New sources 
still had to meet tight emission standards, restricting their demand. In attainment areas most 
new sources could avoid the obligatory use of offsets by applying BACT (Palmisano, 1993). 
Demand from existing sources is also limited, since they have either already installed 
(durable) pollution control equipment (Hahn and Hester, 1989a, Tietenberg, 1989) or because 
there is no effective (mandatory) policy for them to become engaged in trading (Rehbinder 
and Sprenger, 1985). Furthermore, the tougher definition of baseline emissions and the 20 
percent additional cutback under the 1986 policy, shrank even further an already low interest 
in bubbles (Elman, 1993). Similarly, offset rates exceeding unity for distant sources restrict 
demand further (Dwyer, 1992). 
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Uncertainty on the status of the property rights also has limited trading. Uncertainty 
on whether sellers would achieve their reductions, on the buyer's baseline and whether the 
trade would be accepted limited the interest in trading (Hahn and Hester, 1989a). Moreover, 
trading policy, which sets the 'rules of the game' for firms that trade, was uncertain; it 
changed frequently and inhibited trading (Boland, 1989). There was too much debate and 
controversy making states afraid to touch the issue (Elman, 1993). The conflicting interests 
of environmentalists and business led to the creation of policies with no explicit definition 
of the nature of the property right (Hahn, 1989). Furthermore, for strategic reasons, firms 
would rather hoard permits for own, future use than sell them (Vivian and Hall, 1981). 
Responsible managers are believed to be risk-averse rather than act as textbook profit 
maximizers (Palmisano, 1993). 
Transaction costs mainly consist of two elements: finding a trading partner and 
obtaining approval from the authorities. Searching for sellers is a formidable task, since 
market information is scarce, typical permit prices and clear price signals are absent, and the 
outcome of the search is unpredictable (Vivian and Hall, 1981; Hahn and Hester, 1989a; 
Foster and Hahn (1993). Brokerage fees depend on the value of the trade, the complexity of 
the transaction and vary between 4 to 30 % (Dwyer, 1992; Foster and Hahn, 1993). Another 
element are the costs and the length of the approval procedure. The administrative fees and 
the preparation of supporting material might, typically, cost $25000, with $10000 as a 
minimum (Foster and Hahn, 1993). Federal approval is much more costly and lengthy than 
state approval for emission trading (Hahn and Hester, 1989a). Air quality modelling is 
expensive and tends to raise new questions, and only a few trades requiring such models have 
been implemented (Tietenberg, 1989). Approval is not only costly but, and perhaps more 
important, its outcome is uncertain. Data for California suggest that, on average, out of the 
100 trades proposed, 50 fall through during brokering; authorities accept 10 immediately, 
reject 20, and 20 have to be revised before being accepted (Foster and Hahn, 1993). 
3.3 Environmental effectiveness, administrative practicality and innovation 
EPA's emission trading program, generally, had a neutral impact on both the level of 
emissions and on air quality. In some cases bubbles lead to speeding up compliance and 
faster achievement of emission reductions. In other cases, partial deterioration in air quality 
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may not have been prevented. Dudek and Palmisano (1988) maintain that emission trading 
has not been hostile to air quality objectives, since institutional safeguards exist for 
maintaining environmental protection. Although offsets, per definition, should reduce 
emissions, Hahn and Hester (1989a) remark that they may not protect air quality in the way 
intended because of inadequate emission inventories and the fact that allowable emissions 
may be higher than actual emission. Since the number of offsets was small, regulators 
carefully analyzed trades and trading rules contain provisions preventing emission increases 
the ultimate impact of offsets was insignificant. Bubbles and netting had little impact on 
emissions and air quality due to: the review process, the participation of environmental and 
public interests groups disapproving bubbles and the fact that netting is intra-firm and at the 
same location (Hahn and Hester, 1989a; Liroff, 1986). Banking has had a neutral to positive 
impact since banked permits could not or only temporarily be used (Rehbinder and Sprenger, 
1985). In conclusion, emission trading, generally has had a neutral impact on emissions and 
air quality, although in some specific cases positive or negative impacts may have occurred. 
The administrative burden of the emission trading policy can be viewed as high. Long 
preparation time of trading policies, frequent policy amendments, the lengthy approval 
process for individual cases (4 to 29 months), including the creation of an emission reduction 
credit, imply not only a substantial workload but also high administrative costs (Opschoor 
and Vos, 1989). In the case of netting, however, savings in administrative costs may have 
occurred since this allowed sources to avoid the major source review process (Hahn and 
Hester, 1989a). 
The emission trading program is believed to have encouraged technological progress 
in pollution control to a limited degree. The availability of relatively inexpensive emission 
control opportunities combined with the lagged industrial response to the emission trading 
program in general, prevented broad scale invention and innovation (Dudek and Palmisano, 
1988). In some cases, bubbles allowed industries to benefit from inventive solutions 
(Opschoor and Vos, 1989). The substitution of water-based solvents for solvents containing 
volatile organic compounds is -one example (Tietenberg, 199 1). 
3.4 Concluding remarks 
If we compare the European and the earlier US EPA effort to increase the flexibility 
of emission policies we see similarities as well as differences. 
In the first place, there are resemblances in the instruments that have been used. 
EPA's netting policy for intra-plant compensations look very much like the Dutch average 
standard policy for oil refineries. The bubble policy in the US resembles the Danish and 
Dutch bubble for the electricity sector and the Dutch bubble for oil refineries. The offset 
policy seems not to differ very much from the German new plant clause and compensation 
rule. Only banking of emission reduction is lacking in Europe. 
Next to these resemblances in the types of instruments that have been applied there 
are other similarities. On both sides of the Atlantic the rules that should increase flexibility 
have been crafted on an existing system of direct regulation in the form of emission 
standards. The new 'rules' have been more of a complement to than a substitute for existing 
emission policies. And in Europe and the US the 'trades' that have resulted from these added 
options have been mainly internal. 
However, these resemblances should not distract our attention from the differences 
between both approaches. A first and important difference is that in the US the rules for 
increasing flexibility are more universal, explicit and formal. All four instruments - netting, 
offsets, bubbles and banking - are applicable in all states, apply (in principle) to all 
(stationary) sources under the Clean Air Act and the options and trading rules have been laid 
down in statutes. In contrast, the Dutch and Danish bubbles and the Dutch netting policy 
have, to a great extent, the character of informal, ad hoc solutions for homogeneous sectors 
with a very limited number of polluters. The German new source renewal clause and 
compensation rule is formal law and general but spatial and regulatory constraints restrict the 
number of feasible options considerably. As a result there have hardly been external trades 
in the three European countries, whereas they did occur in the US. 
Although the EPA trading program was more conducive to creating markets than the 
European efforts to increase flexibility, it was far from perfect. In its design and even more 
in its actual implementation, it contained several elements that reduced the options for 
profitable trade between sources and higher cost effectiveness. The most important among 
them are the following: 
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- Part of the emission reduction credits can be confiscated by authority's demand that 
the compensating reduction of emissions exceeds the increase of emissions (offset 
rates > 1). 
- Restriction of trade to relatively small areas. 
- Continuation of existing emission standards. 
- Uncertainty about how much of the potential seller's emission reduction will be 
authorized as ERCs and about how much of the potential buyer's increase of 
emissions will constitute authorized demand for ERCs. 
The reduction of profitable trades brought about by these restrictions and uncertainties 
increases the problems of finding a trading partner. As a consequence, transaction costs 
increase, the market becomes more illiquid, price signals are sparse and unstable, which in 
turn increases market uncertainty. In the next section we shall see that EPA has learned from 
its earlier experiences and has managed to avoid the bottlenecks in its acid rain program. 
4. Sulfur trading; under the 1990 CAAA 
4.1 Harnessing market forces to curb acidifying emissions 
In November 1990, the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) became law (US 
Congress, 1990; USEPA, 1990). Title IV of the amendments contains provisions to control 
the acid deposition caused by sulfur and nitrogen oxides emissions. The objectives of the acid 
rain program are (USEPA, 1992a): 
1. to reduce the adverse impacts of acid deposition through a very drastic reduction in 
the annual sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions and of nitrogen oxides; 
2. to achieve these reductions at the lowest costs by employing traditional methods and 
an emission allowance trading system. 
For SO2, the acid rain program introduces a nationwide emission trading scheme for 
electricity producers. This sector is responsible for nearly 70 percent of the SO2 emissions 
in the US. The SO2 emissions have to be reduced from 19 million tons in 1980 to about 9 
million tons in 2000; a reduction of more than 50 percent. The 10 million cutback of 
emissions from fossil fuel fired power plants is to be achieved in two stages. Phase I starts 
in 1995 and affects 110 electric utility plants in 21 eastern and midwestern states, and places 
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a cap of 5.7 million ton on these units. Phase I1 begins in 2000, tightens the emission caps 
for these 110 plants and imposes restrictions on smaller, cleaner plants throughout the US. 
In effect, a cap of 8.95 million ton SO, is placed on the number of allowances. An SO, 
emission allowance is an authorization to emit one ton of SO, during or after a specific year 
(USEPA, 1992b). 
An allowance does not constitute a property right and does not limit the authority of 
the United States to terminate or limit such authorization (US Congress, 1990, p. 2591- 
2592). The initial allocation of allowances is such that allowances are allocated for each year 
beginning in 1995. The baseline for allocating allowances is the average fossil fuel 
consumption from 1985 to 1987. Additional allowances have been given to various units, 
including units in Illinois, Indiana and Ohio. 
At the end of each year each unit is to hold allowances at least equal to its annual 
emissions. Furthermore, regardless of the allowances a unit holds it is never entitled to 
exceed the ambient air quality standards for public health (NAAQS). The unit is free to 
possess the allowances but it might not be able to use them to increase emissions if this 
threatens to violate ambient standards. The system for monitoring and enforcement is an 
interesting element of the scheme. Every source with a capacity of over 25 MW that falls 
under the programma has to install a continuous monitoring system (CMES). This implies 
that emissions are measured and recorded continuously. Compliance is determined at the end 
of the year. Units are granted a 30-day grace period during which allowances may be 
purchased to cover emissions. Excess allowances may be banked or sold. If a unit emits 
more allowances than it holds, a penalty of $2000 must be paid per excess ton of emissions. 
Moreover, the excess emissions have to be offset in the following year (USEPA, 1992a). The 
sanction applies 'automatically', without the necessity for EPA to bring the offender to court. 
There are different ways to obtain permits, apart from the initial allocation. Firstly, 
allowances may be sold, bought or banked by any person, not only utility representatives, 
but also individual corporations, brokers, municipalities, environmental groups and private 
citizens. It was expected that a secondary market would develop when allowances that had 
been handed out are exchanged. Secondly, allowances can be obtained from three EPA 
reserves (USEPA, 1992b, 1992~): 
1. for installing technologies that remove at least 90 percent of the emissions (phase I); 
2. for implementing energy conservation or renewable energy projects; 
2 1 
3. a set-aside of allowances for auctions and for direct sales. 
Newcomers (those who begin operating in 1996 or later) are not allocated any allowances for 
free. They will have to buy on the secondary market or from EPA auctions and direct sales. 
However, independent power producers have priority in purchasing allowances for a fixed 
price of $1500 (indexed to inflation) in the direct sales (USEPA, 1992~).  
The purpose of the auctions and annual direct sales is to ensure that independent 
power producers (IPP), which were not covered by the grandfathering scheme because of the 
small size of their capacities, but are the fastest growers in the sector, will get the allowances 
they need. But other parties are admitted as well as buyers or sellers. These allowances come 
from a special reserve of 2.8 per cent of the annual allowances. 
The auctions are held once every year, and began in 1993. Auctions and direct sales 
have been made a part of the trading scheme for fear that potential entrants (independent 
power producers) would be unable to obtain a sufficient number of emission allowances in 
the secondary market. The auction consists of a spot auction, where allowances are sold that 
can be used in the same year (from 1995 on) and an advance auction of allowances that can 
be used not earlier than seven years after the year they have been emitted. In the auction, a 
fixed number of permits is offered from the EPA reserve. In addition to the EPA supply is 
the supply of other holders of allowances who are willing to sell. They state the number and 
type of allowances on sale and, optionally, their reservation price. Bidders have to send in 
sealed orders on the number and type of allowances they are willing to buy at a stated 
(maximum) price. The auctioneer then couples the highest demand price with the lowest 
supply price until the point where demand and supply price meet and the market is cleared. 
Figure 1 illustrates a possible outcome. 
The rules for the auction are geared to maximizing the revenue. They require that the 
buyer pays his stated demand price. This implies a system of price discrimination and capture 
of part of the buyer's rent. Revenues and unsold allowances are returned on a pro rata basis 
to those units from which EPA withheld allowances to create the special reserve. 
Direct sales differ from auctions in that a given maximum number of permits per year 
is available at a fixed price of $ 1500 (per ton SO2 emissions), indexed to inflation. 
Allowances are sold to everyone who presents himself as a buyer on a first-come first-serve 
basis. However, there is a guarantee for an IPP that is planning a new plant and has not been 
able to obtain allowances at the auction or in the secondary market for a price not higher 
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than $ 750 that he can buy the allowances he needs for the fixed price of $ 1500. The price 
has been set as high as $ 1500 in order to keep this as a last resort (Zapfel, 1994). Figure 
2 shows how direct sales work in principle. Proceeds from the sales are again returned to 
those units which contributed to the special reserve (USEPA, 1992a). 
EPA records all permit transfers and ensures that a unit does not emit more than the 
allowances it holds. For this purpose, EPA is to maintain an allowance tracking system. 
Allowance transfers require the submission of transfer forms to EPA, signed by the 
representatives of both parties (USEPA, 1992b). 
4.2 Cost-effectiveness (or how well the permit market performs) 
Obviously, it is too early for a full evaluation of the sulfur trading, since Phase I 
starts in 1995. It is possible, however, to indicate the expected costs savings, compare 
expected market activity and prices with realizations, and analyze the circumstances that 
influenced the market so far. Table 2 shows that the sulfur trading program has the potential 
to cut costs by 40 to 45 percent over the period 1995-2010 (ICF, 1992; ICF, 1994). Costs 
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Figure 2 Direct sales 
consist mainly of pollution control cost measures and (for a minor part of about 10 percent 
of total costs) of the costs of implementing the ~ c h e m e . ~  
The estimates of savings on pollution control costs are based on linear programming 
models. Implicitly they assume a perfect market. Achievement of the potential cost savings 
depends on how well the market operates in practice. Figure 3 shows the supply and demand 
observed at EPA's spot auction in March 1993 for permits to be used in Phase I. 
3 Major component of the allowance system costs are the expected transaction costs of 
200 to 400 million US$ for the utilities. Minor cost components are the allowance 
tracking system, the auctions, direct sales and the conservation and renewable energy 
reserve. Transaction costs are based on a traded volume of 1 to 2 billionlyear and 
transaction cost of 1.5 percent (ICF, 1992). Major component of the implementation 
costs, however, are the cost of monitoring (Table 2). Monitoring costs are expected 
to be lower under the trading program than under a traditional program since EPA 
does not require continuous monitoring for sources with very low emissions (ICF, 
1992, p 4-26). This seems rather artificial since the same rational approach could 
have been adopted under a traditional program. 
Table 2. Estimated costs and cost saving of sulfur trading for the period 1995-2010 (in 
Million US$ of 1990) 
Type of Costs Traditional National Trading Cost Savings 
Control Program 
1. Pollution control 19,100-30,900 9,500-17,100 9,600-13,800 
2. Implementation: 
a. Allowance system 0 207-4 10 -207 to -4 10 
b. Monitoring 2,225 2,612 -387 
c. Permits 0 5 8 -58 
Total costs 21,300-33,100 12,400-20,300 8,900-12,900 
Source: ICF, 1991 
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Quantity (1 000 tons) 
I I 
Figure 3 The 1993 spot market auction 
Table 3 gives the estimates on prices and volumes based on model calculations 
(column 2), an overview of actual prices and volumes on the secondary markets (column 3) 
and the official data on the EPA allowance auction held in March 1993 and March 1994 
(columns 4 and 5). The table suggests the following: 
















